Filosofismos 1 [«Of Merit and Demerit»]

"To reward, is to recompence, to remunerate, to return good for good received. To punish, too, is to recompence, to remunerate, though in a different manner; it is to return evil for evil that has been done."

"The man who does not recompense his benefactor, when he has it in his power, and when his benefactor needs assistance, is, no doubt, guilty of the blackest ingratitude. (...) But still he does no positive hurt to any body. He only does not do that good which in propriety he ought to have done. He is the object of hatred, a passion which is naturally excited by impropriety of sentiment and behaviour; not of resentment, a passion which is never called forth but by actions which tend to do real and positive hurt to some particular persons. His want of gratitude, therefore, cannot be punished. To oblige him by force to perform what in gratitude he ought to perform, and what every impartial spectator would approve of him for performing, would, if possible, be still mroe improper than his negleting to perform it. His benefactor would dishonour himself if he attempted by violence to constrain him to gratitude, and it would be impertinent for any third person, who was not superior of either, to intermediate."

"To be deprived of that which we are possessed of, is a greater evil than to be disappointed of what we have only expectation. Breach of property, therefore, theft and robbery, which take from us what we are possessed of, are greater crimes than breach of contract, which only disappoints us of what we are expected. The most sacred laws of justice, therefore, those whose violation seems to call loudest for vengeance and punishment, are the laws which guard the life and person of our neighbour; the next are those which guard his property and possessions; and last of all come those which guard what we called his personal rights, or what is due to him from the promises of others."

Adam Smith, in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments"